All are cordially invited to the Econ-Talk "Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching." by  Prof. Saptarshi Mukherjee (IIT-D), on Wednesday, Oct 06, at 4.00pm.

Title: Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching. [Co-authors: N.Muto and A. Sen]

Abstract:

This paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single-object auction, the second-price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good provision prob- lem, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism can be outperformed from the viewpoint of a designer who wishes to minimise deficit subject to efficiency. In the two-sided matching environment where preferences on one side of the market are private information, the social choice correspondence that outputs all stable matchings at every preference profile, is implementable.

Date: Oct 06, 2021 (Wednesday); Time: 4.00-5.00pm

MS-Team Link